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Around the world, electricity generation requires water for cooling, running turbines, 
cleaning processes and power plant operation. Accordingly, the globally increasing 
demand for electricity produces a growing demand for water. Particularly in Iran, 
and other parts of the Middle East and North Africa, diminishing water resources are 
very likely to adversely affect not only the primary energy production, but also the 
operation of electricity generation capacities, putting energy security at risk while 
jeopardizing the region’s social and economic development.
In Iran, the increasing depletion of the country’s water resources is becoming a seri-
ous issue. Among other consequences, water scarcity has already affected the Iranian 
power sector, which depends heavily on water-intensive thermal and hydro-power 
generation technologies. At the same time, the already fast-paced growth in electric-
ity demand is expected to further accelerate in the future, if the nation’s demand for 
water is to be satisfied by the application of energy-intensive desalination and water 
re-use technologies. Thus, Iran’s power sector is not only affected by, but contributes 
to the country’s water stress.
This publication intends to provide a comprehensive overview of the water-energy 
nexus’ relevance to the Iranian electricity sector, by illustrating key trends, analysing 
water-related challenges and identifying knowledge gaps. It summarises the results 
of a workshop, and a series of dialogues with Iranian energy and water experts, in 
which both the current situation and future water-related risks and impacts on the 
Iranian power sector were discussed. Based on those results, it highlights research 
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1. Introduction
Water and energy are closely interlinked. Water is need-
ed at every stage of the energy supply chain, and energy 
is needed to extract, distribute, treat and desalinate wa-
ter. These complex interdependencies and trade-offs be-
tween water and energy are part of the so-called water-
energy nexus. 
Particularly in regions affected by water stress, the in-
creasing demand for energy can lead to greater water 
scarcity, just as the energy sector can be affected by re-
duced water availability. At the same time, the decreased 
availability of both ground and surface water encourages 
the use of energy-intensive desalination and water re-use 
technologies, especially in the dry areas of the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA).
Iran faces just such a situation. It is affected by a growing 
depletion of its water resources, due to both a chang-
ing climate, and the growth of water demand in the 
agricultural, industrial and residential sectors. Against 
the background of increased energy demand, depleted 
water resources could adversely affect the fossil fuel in-
dustry, as well as the operation of electricity generation 
capacities. This could put Iran’s energy security at risk 
and jeopardise the country’s social and economic de-
velopment.
The risks of water stress to energy security, in general – 
and to the power sector in particular – have thus far been 
barely examined. A deeper understanding of water’s role 
in Iran’s current and future energy system is needed. 
Electricity generation infrastructures are designed to last 
for decades, and influence the energy sector’s long-term 
water requirements. To lower the risks of competition 
for water across sectors, the future availability of water 
should be taken into account in today’s energy planning.
This study provides a first comprehensive overview of the 
water-energy nexus’ relevance for energy security in the 
Iranian electricity sector. The assessment is based on the 
results of a workshop, and a series of dialogues with Ira-
nian energy, water and agriculture experts, in which both 
the current situation and future challenges related to the 
water-energy nexus were discussed.
Water for
Energy
Primary energy production 
and electricity generation
require water 







Source: based on World Bank 2013
Figure 1. Schematic overview Water-Energy Nexus
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2. Overview of the Water-Energy Nexus
Water and energy are essential to sustain and enhance 
economic growth and social development. Yet, due to 
their uneven geographical distribution, the resources 
needed to ensure reliable supply of both water and en-
ergy services are becoming increasingly scarce in many 
countries and regions worldwide. Today, 2.8 billion peo-
ple – more than a third of the world’s population – live 
in areas of high water stress. If present trends continue, 
the number is expected to rise to 3.9 billion by 2030 
(OECD 2011). On the energy side, an estimated 1.1 bil-
lion people – 14 percent of the global population – lack 
access to electricity, and even more have only an un-
reliable supply of modern energy services (OECD / IEA 
2017). In addition, increasing temperature and reduced 
precipitation levels, as well as extreme weather events 
associated with climate change (like heat waves, floods, 
droughts and storms), add to the pressure on energy 
and water resources. At the same time, the demand 
for water and energy is increasing due to population 
growth, economic development, urbanisation and 
changing consumer habits. Securing the supply of wa-
ter and energy under these circumstances poses severe 
challenges on both the national and international levels, 
due to the high interconnectedness of both energy and 
water systems.
Energy and water resource systems are not only linked 
within themselves. Far-reaching interdependencies be-
tween the two systems also exist. Water is required to 
generate energy, and energy is needed to extract, distrib-
ute and treat water. Actions and decisions in one of the 
sectors can significantly affect the other. The complex 
interdependencies, trade-offs and synergies that exist 
between the water and energy systems are commonly 
referred to as the water-energy nexus (WE-Nexus).
Historically, around the world, water and energy sys-
tems have been planned, developed, regulated and 
managed separately. Today, the interdependencies be-
tween water and energy are widely recognised, and 
the concept of the water-energy nexus has become 
increasingly prominent among international organisa-
tions, development agencies, academics, policy analysts 
and other stakeholders. However, on the ground, a so-
called »silo mentality« still prevails. Typically, water and 
energy challenges continue to be addressed within sec-
torial boundaries particularly in terms of project, invest-
ment and policy decisions (Bhattacharyya et al. 2015). 
In consequence, knowledge gaps regarding the extent 
of linkages between water and energy systems hinder 
integrated planning.
A deeper understanding of the risks and opportunities 
is particularly needed on the energy side of the nexus 
(IRENA 2015), as water has thus far been prioritised in 
the mainstream nexus discussions (Allouche et al. 2015). 
While water security is, in many ways, closely linked to 
energy security, more detailed knowledge on water’s 
role with regard to energy security in both current en-
ergy systems and different future energy development 
pathways is required. Given the significant energy invest-
ments currently being made in many countries, now is 
a crucial time to ensure that the most efficient and ef-
fective pathways for the water and energy sectors are 
chosen to meet sustainability goals.
Besides the potential effects of water constraints on en-
ergy security, the decreasing availability of ground and 
surface water may significantly increase energy demand 
for energy-intensive desalination and water re-use tech-
nologies. Particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, 
the use of unconventional water sources with such tech-
nologies is expected to be a significant driver of energy 
demand, which needs to be taken into account when 
addressing the water-energy nexus.
2.1 Water for Energy
Water is needed at every stage of the energy supply 
chain, from the extraction and processing of energy car-
riers (nuclear-, fossil-, and biofuels), to power and heat 
generation, and cooling. Moreover, both the manufac-
ture of energy systems and the construction and opera-
tion of power plants also require significant amounts 
of water. Depending on the energy source, and the 
conversion technology, water requirements vary signifi-
cantly. Conventional fuels require water for extraction, 
transport and processing; thermal power plants using 
nuclear sources or fossil fuels require large amounts 
of water for cooling and generating electricity, while 
large-scale hydropower plants are only viable if rivers 
or reservoirs have sufficient water levels and water in-
flows (World Bank 2013). Renewable energy resources 
also require water. For example, the operation of con-
centrated solar power (CSP) plants requires water for 
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cooling and mirror cleaning, while solar photovoltaic 
plants require water mainly for cleaning (IRENA 2015). 
Bioenergy generation requires water for both feedstock 
production and power plant operation (either for cool-
ing in thermal plants, or in biogas plants as input for the 
anaerobic digestion process).
In the electricity sector, both generation technology and 
energy source influence the water requirements. In par-
ticular, for the large share of thermal power plants, water 
requirements depend strongly on the cooling technol-
ogy employed. Wet-cooling technologies, for example, 
generally require more water than dry-cooling options. 
However, given the fact that some advanced cooling 
technologies withdraw less water from the water source, 
but consume more water overall (OECD / IEA 2016), both 
water withdrawals and water consumption need to be 
taken into account when evaluating water use.
Globally, the energy sector accounts for an estimated 
10-15 percent of global freshwater withdrawals, and 3 
percent of total water consumption (OECD / IEA 2016; 
IRENA 2015).1 At 88 percent, the largest amounts of wa-
ter are used for electricity generation (Fig. 2). Electricity 
generation requires water mainly for cooling purposes, 
with 70 percent of the total installed capacity worldwide 
being thermal power plants (OECD / IEA 2016). In primary 
energy production, the major share of water is used for 
the extraction of fossil fuels, and as input in feedstock 
production for biofuels.
2.2 Energy for Water Desalination and Re-use
Water is not only needed in the energy supply chain, 
but energy is also needed to extract, distribute and treat 
water. The water sector uses energy, to a large extent, 
in the form of electricity. The amount of energy required 
for the provision of water strongly depends on the wa-
1. Water withdrawals refer to the amount of water removed from, but 
later returned to, the water source. Water returns can affect the water 
quality of the water source. For example, cooling water often has higher 
temperatures on its return to the water source, which can result in ther-
mal pollution. Water consumption refers to the amount of water that is 
permanently removed from the water source.
Notes: Renewables includes solar PV, CSP, wind, geothermal and bioenergy. Water requirements are quantified for »source-to-carrier« primary energy 
production (oil, gas, coal), a definition which includes extraction, processing and transport. Water withdrawals and consumption for biofuels account 
for the irrigation of dedicated feedstock and wa-ter use for processing. For electricity generation, freshwater requirements are for the operational phase, 
including cleaning, cooling and other process related needs; water used for the production of input fuels is excluded. Hydropower is excluded.
Source: OECD / IEA 2016
Figure 2. Overview distribution of water withdrawals in the global energy sector in 2014
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ter source, the transport distance, the relief of the ter-
rain and the type of treatment facility (OECD/IEA 2016). 
Groundwater extraction generally requires more energy 
than surface water supply. Most energy-intensive by far, 
however, is the supply of non-traditional water sources 
with desalination or re-use technologies.
Although today the majority of water is supplied from 
surface- and groundwater sources, with increasing levels 
of water stress, non-traditional water sources are pro-
gressively gaining importance, especially in the Middle 
East and North Africa (ibid.). Water desalination is already 
substantially increasing the energy demand in the MENA 
region (Delgado et al. 2017). While the water sector ac-
counts for about 4 percent of world electricity consump-
tion, in the Middle East it already accounts for 9 percent, 
with a quarter of water-related energy consumption be-
ing attributable to desalination (OECD/IEA 2016).
In the future, the share of non-traditional water from 
desalination in the overall water supply is expected to in-
crease significantly. Accordingly, the electricity demand for 
desalination is also expected to increase. Today, 5 percent 
of the electricity consumed by the water sector is used for 
desalination. Projections by the International Energy Agen-
cy (OECD/IEA 2016) indicate that the share of electricity 
consumed by desalination will quadruple to more than 
20 percent by 2040. Today, about 30 terawatt hours of 
electricity are used, worldwide, for desalination; in 2040, 
it is projected that, depending on the scenario, 295 to 
345 terawatt hours will be consumed for desalination. By 
2040, the lion’s share of 250 terawatt hours of electricity 
is expected to be used for desalination in the Middle East 
and North Africa (ibid.). The increasing energy demand for 
desalination must be considered when analysing current 
and future water demand for energy generation. Moreo-
ver, in countries with high shares of desalination, one must 
also consider the extent to which water constraints affect-
ing energy security may also, indirectly, affect the future 
supply of non-traditional water resources.
2.3 Climate Change and Its Effects on 
Water-Related Risks to Energy Security
In addition to increased demand for water in all sectors, 
the impacts of climate change are expected to put fur-
ther pressure on water resources worldwide. The main cli-
mate-related drivers influencing water availability are pre-
cipitation, temperature and evaporative levels (Bates et al. 
2008). Potential negative impacts from future changes in 
precipitation, temperature and evaporative levels include 
increased frequency and duration of droughts and floods, 
decreased water quality (due to higher water tempera-
tures), longer periods of low flows and increased erosion 
and sedimentation levels (ibid.). Although it is expected 
that changes in climate and weather will affect all regions 
of the globe, the degree to which different regions and 
countries are impacted will vary significantly.
As one of the most water-stressed regions in the world 
today, the Middle East and North Africa is projected to 
be among the regions most severely impacted by the 
negative effects of climate change, namely increased 
aridity and higher temperatures (IPCC 1997). It has been 
projected that the annual water discharge in the MENA 
region, which is already critically low, will drop by an-
other 15–45 percent in a 2 degree Celsius warmer world 
(and by 75 percent in a 4 degree Celsius warmer world) 
(Lelieveld et al. 2016). In addition, climate change projec-
tions foresee heat extremes with higher maximum tem-
peratures during the hottest days (e. g., a rise from to-
day’s baseline of 43 degrees Celsius to about 46 degrees 
Celsius by mid-century, and almost 50 degrees Celsius 
by the end of the century) (Waha et al. 2017). Such chal-
lenges will put the region’s future ability to provide water 
to its population, and to its different economic sectors, 
to the test (World Bank 2018).
Accordingly, reduced water availability has been named 
by the International Energy Agency (OECD / IEA 2015) as 
one of the major climate change-related risks to the en-
ergy sector, not only in the MENA region, but worldwide. 
Most energy systems are sensitive in terms of both the 
amounts and quality of the water they require (IRENA 
2015). Reduced water availability, as well as changes in 
temperature, volume flow rates and water density can 
have substantial effects on energy systems. This is es-
pecially the case for the electricity sector. Hydropower 
production can, for example, be affected by decreasing 
water levels, low flow rates and reservoir sedimentation. 
Thermal power plants, which need large amounts of wa-
ter for cooling, can likewise be affected by reduced wa-
ter availability and higher water temperatures, which can 
reduce cooling efficiency and lead to increased cooling 
water demand (OECD / IEA 2015). The cultivation of feed-
stock to produce biofuels could also be negatively im-
pacted by reduced water availability, as could fossil fuel 
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production, given the fact that extraction and processing 
of fossil fuels, such as oil products and natural gas, re-
quire large amounts of water (ibid.). It should be noted 
that nearly all onshore oil reserves in the Middle East are 
located in areas at risk of water scarcity (SBC 2014).
Water availability is not only a concern for the future of 
the energy sector. Limitations in water supply are already 
restricting the development and operation of conven-
tional and renewable energy sources (SBC 2014). In the 
United States, for example, limited water availability due 
to droughts constrained the operation of power plants 
and other energy production activities in 2012 (DOE 
2014). In 2015, droughts in Brazil restricted hydropower 
production, necessitating a switch to back-up fossil-
fuelled power generation (OECD / IEA 2015). In France, 
one third of nuclear capacity was offline in 2009 because 
of high water temperatures; in 2015, heat waves led to a 
lack of cooling water, and the consequent reduction of 
thermal power generation in several European countries 
(Fernández-Blanco et al. 2017). In the same year, a coal-
fired power plant in India had to be shut down due to 
water shortages, which also caused the commissioning 
of a new unit at the same plant to be postponed (PEI 
2015). These examples show that – worldwide – water 
limitations have already constrained power generation 
and capacity expansions. With water-related risk to ener-
gy supply and electricity generation expected to increase, 
we need to assess how these developments might affect 
energy security on both the national and international 
levels, not only in terms of existing energy systems, but 
future energy infrastructure developments as well.
2.4 The Water-Energy Nexus and the 
Agricultural and Food Sector
Despite the increased demand for water, and coinciding 
decline of both water availability and water quality world-
wide, the energy system is not the major consumer of 
water. Globally, the agricultural sector is the sector with 
the highest water requirements, accounting for about 70 
percent of all freshwater withdrawals worldwide (FAO 
2016a). The agricultural and food sector also accounts for 
about 30 percent of global energy demand (FAO 2014). 
This demand is only projected to increase, as roughly 60 
percent more food must be produced by 2050 to meet 
the growing global demand (ibid.). Accordingly, the nexus 
debate is often extended from water and energy to the 
agricultural and food sector (Water-Energy-Food Nexus). 
While focusing on the water-for-energy link in the nexus, 
the water requirements of the agriculture and food sec-
tor need to be taken into account, as allocation of water 
resources to the energy sector can result in an increase of 
water security-related risks in other sectors (IRENA 2015). 
Thus, the aim should be to avoid trade-offs and potential 
conflicts over water between the energy and food sec-
tor, wherever possible. However, given diminishing water 
resources, governments (especially in regions affected by 
water scarcity) will likely have to com-promise between 
water, energy and food security (ibid.). 
This will likely also be the case in Iran, where the agricul-
tural sector is, by far, the largest and least efficient con-
sumer of water (FAO 2016b). As water becomes a scarce 
resource, the extensive water use for farming is having 
direct consequences for other sectors, including the en-
ergy sector. Measures taken in the agricultural sector to 
reduce the pressure on the country’s water resources 
could therefore also help mitigate some of the water-re-
lated risks to and impacts on other sectors. Nevertheless, 
the energy sector should also actively seek solutions to 
reduce its own water consumption, to help ensure energy 
security and improve the overall water situation in Iran.
3. The Water-Energy Nexus in  
the Islamic Republic of Iran –  
An Analysis of the Status Quo
The public awareness of water scarcity in Iran has signifi-
cantly increased in recent years. Since the beginning of 
2018, the topic has garnered more attention in the public 
debate, due to the challenges that are increasingly being 
felt as a consequence of water shortage in the country. 
Declining water levels in various lakes and wetlands, such 
as Lake Urmia, are frequently discussed. Although this 
year, at lake Urmia, there have been initial signs of recov-
ery, the water levels of this important water body have 
been falling for over 20 years (Jalili et al. 2016). Climate 
change and increasing water demand from the agricultur-
al sector have further worsened the situation. Those worst 
affected by this trend are local farmers, as disruption of 
the water supply directly affects their livelihoods. This is 
not only the case for those farmers who depend on water 
from lake Urmia. It is an overarching development, as over 
90 percent of the annual water withdrawal in Iran is used 
by the agricultural sector for irrigation and livestock farm-
J. TERRAPON-PFAFF, T. FINK & S. LECHTENBÖHMER | THE WATER-ENERGY NEXUS IN IRAN
8
ing. The agricultural sector is the major water consumer in 
Iran, and consequently, the sector most affected by water 
stress. Accordingly, the link between water and agricul-
ture in Iran is, and has already been, widely discussed.
Compared to the agricultural sector, the share of water 
consumed by the energy sector is much lower. Yet, this 
year, the shortage of water has already affected the elec-
tricity supply in Iran. With decreasing water resource avail-
ability, aspects of energy security and water allocation will 
become even more important in the near future. This is 
especially true given the fact that Iranian energy demand – 
particularly the demand for electricity – is expected to in-
crease significantly from 253 terawatt hours in 2016 to 
over 350 terawatt hours in 2040 (OECD/IEA 2018; Azadi 
et al. 2017). The growing electricity demand has various 
causes, some of which relate to the region’s changing 
climate; increasing temperatures, for example, can result 
in a growing electricity demand for cooling. In turn, the 
growing electricity demand drives the demand for water 
in the power sector. Meanwhile, the supply of unconven-
tional water through energy-intensive seawater desali-
nation techniques, or waste water recovery methods, is 
expected to stimulate de-mand for electricity in the water 
sector. All these different driving forces fuel the demand 
for electricity, generating a surge in water demand for 
electricity generation. Such interdependencies will likely 
lead to new dynamics in the Iranian water-energy nexus.
As energy is fundamental for social and economic devel-
opment, increasing disruptions and rising costs are critical. 
By strengthening awareness of the inter-linkage between 
the Iranian energy and water systems, trade-offs might be 
considered in decision-making processes today, in order 
to avert any future lock-in effects and adverse impacts on 
the Iranian economy and population. In particular, renew-
able energies like wind and photovoltaic hardly require 
any water resources to operate, and could furthermore 
support the creation of local employment in affected ar-
eas. Such aspects should be considered today, when mak-
ing decisions regarding future energy infrastructures.
3.1 Iran’s Energy Sector and Resulting 
Implications for Water Demand
The Islamic Republic of Iran is rich in energy sources, and 
a net energy exporter. Iran has the fourth-largest proven 
oil reserves, and the second-largest proven natural gas 
reserves, in the world (IEA 2017). Accordingly, the oil 
and gas industry plays a key role in the country’s econo-
my, and contributes significantly to Iran’s financial reve-
nues. On the demand side, the country has experienced 
a very rapid increase in domestic energy demand in the 
last decades, due not only to high population growth, 
increased urbanisation and changing consumer habits, 
but also to subsidy-induced overuse and high inefficien-
cies in energy production, transport and consumption 
(Moshiri and Lechtenböhmer 2015). Currently, more 
than 95 percent of Iran’s gas production is used domes-
tically (IEA 2018a). Despite the country’s large fossil fuel 
resource deposits, the continuous increase in domestic 
energy demand could reduce the country’s future ca-
pacity to export fossil fuels. Such a development would 
be critical for the Iranian economy, which is strongly de-
pendent on fossil fuel exports.
In order to limit wasteful energy use and slow demand 
growth, reforming the domestic energy market has been 
central on the political agenda; over the last two decades, 
the country has pursued a range of energy subsidy re-
forms. But state-controlled electricity prices remain low, 
in large part due to extreme inflation, making the mod-
ernization of the energy sector and extensions to capacity 
challenging. In addition to domestic difficulties, Iran’s en-
ergy sector has also been affected by international sanc-
tions. As a result, current energy production falls short 
of the country’s potential (Ahmadi 2018). In particular, 
Iran’s crude oil production declined during the previous 
period of international sanctions, but quickly recovered, 
in 2016, with the implementation of the JCPOA (IEA 
2018b; FES 2017). Natural gas production, on the other 
hand, was not affected in the same way by the previous 
sanctions (IEA 2018a). Today, growth is already slowing 
because of the second round of economic sanctions, put 
in place by the USA against the Iranian oil industry, which 
come into effect in November 2018. These sanctions ad-
versely affect both technology investments and trade, 
placing severe constraints on necessary investments, and 
limiting the country’s ability to import renewable energy 
and water-conserving technologies. This lack of access to 
technologies and financing hinders the energy sector’s 
modernization efforts, and indirectly affects that sector’s 
future water de-mand.
Iran is among the countries with the highest amounts of 
water used in the energy sector (Spang et al. 2014). Water 
demand in the energy sector comprises water consump-
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tion and withdrawal in both the primary energy sector 
and electricity sector. The former includes the exploration 
and processing of fossil fuel resources, such as crude oil 
and natural gas.
Primary Energy Production
In Iran, the major share of water consumed by the ener-
gy sector is utilized in primary energy production (Spang 
et al. 2014). Crude oil exploration and processing is es-
pecially water-intensive (on average, water consumption 
in oil exploration ranges from 15–78 cubic meters per 
terajoule; in crude oil refinement the average is 16 cubic 
meters per terajoule); in conventional gas production, 
water consumption is generally lower (on average, 1.6 
cubic meters per terajoule) (OECD / IEA 2016; Williams 
and Simmons 2013; Wu et al. 2009). Accordingly, in the 
Iranian energy sector, most water consumed for fossil 
fuel extraction and processing is used in crude oil pro-
duction and oil refining (Spang et al. 2014). Crude oil 
recovery can be differentiated between primary, sec-
ondary and enhanced oil recovery (EOR). Usually, these 
methods are applied in stages, beginning with primary 
and secondary extraction. Only once these methods are 
exhausted, do EOR methods come into consideration. 
Today, only a minor part of crude oil production still 
belongs to primary recovery, which is less water inten-
sive. The prevailing secondary recovery methods and 
enhanced oil recovery (which comprises a number of 
different methods) are, by contrast, more water-inten-
sive (Wu et al. 2009).
In 2017, Iran’s crude oil production stood at about 3.86 
million barrels per day (OPEC 2018). Since the lifting of 
sanctions in 2016, over half of Iran’s crude oil production 
(56 percent) is exported (IEA 2018b). In the future, it may 
be expected that the water demand for crude oil pro-
duction will further increase. To date, many Iranian oil 
fields have already been exploited for decades, and have 
high decline rates (Azadi et al. 2017). To sustain its crude 
oil production capacities in the future, Iran will have to 
employ more water-intensive EOR technologies. By con-
trast to oil, Iran’s natural gas production is almost com-
pletely used domestically (IEA 2018a). At 44 percent, the 
highest share of gas is used in industry (including fuel 
and feedstock use in the petrochemical industry), fol-
lowed by residential electricity and heat generation (42 
percent) (MOE 2017).
Electricity Generation
With about 78 percent of Iran’s electricity generated 
from natural gas, in 2016, gas is the dominant fuel type 
in the Iranian electricity sector, followed by diesel-oil (8 
percent), fuel-oil (6 percent), hydro (6 percent), nuclear 
(2 percent) and renewables (0.1 percent) (Fig. 3). Apart 
from hydropower (11,278 megawatts installed capacity), 
renewable energies still play a minor role in the Iranian 
electricity system. The dominant share of the electricity 
generation portfolio belongs to fossil fuel fired steam, 
gas and combined cycle power plants (52,391 mega-
watts). By the end of 2015, Iran had produced 86,968 
gigawatt hours of electricity based on steam power 
plants, 75,423 gigawatt hours based on gas power 
plants, and 100,936 gigawatt hours based on combined 
cycle power plants (MOE / Tavanir 2016).
By comparison, water withdrawal and consumption in 
Iran’s electricity sector is much lower than water demand 
for primary energy generation (Spang et al. 2014). Never-
theless, water is becoming a critical factor for the power 
sector, which is already facing occasional blackouts dur-
ing peak demand periods, due to water shortages (es-
pecially in the summer time). With the major share of 
electricity in Iran generated by water-intensive thermal 
power plants, most of the water is used for cooling sys-
tems. The type of cooling systems installed significantly 
influence water withdrawal and consumption. Classical 
cooling systems include once-through cooling systems, 
closed-loop (or wet-recirculating systems, e. g., cooling 
tower systems) and dry-cooling systems. In particular, 
once-through cooling systems are very water intensive, 
as are cooling towers. Only the later, dry-cooling, sys-
tems need almost no water for cooling purposes, al-
though they generate lower plant efficiencies. In Iran, 
regulations are already in place that require new power 
plants to use dry-cooling systems. To date, however, the 
Iranian power sector is still characterized by aging and 
inefficient power infrastructures, with a high number of 
water-intensive cooling systems.
Notwithstanding the country’s increasing water chal-
lenges, water aspects’ relation to electricity generation 
technologies are, with the exception of hydropower, 
rarely discussed. Shrinking water resources, decreasing 
precipitation and higher temperatures have already re-
sulted in declining electricity outputs, due to lower levels 
of saved water in dams. At the same time, the govern-
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ment plans to expand Iran’s electricity generation ca-
pacities to meet the fast-paced growth in demand, and 
to increase its exports. In 2015, a total electricity genera-
tion capacity of 74,103 megawatts was installed, which 
already represents a 20 percent increase over 2010 
(MOE / Tavanir 2016). With further expansions planned, 
this is a critical time to ensure that the most efficient and 
effective pathways for electricity generation and water 
use are chosen, with an eye to preventing future techno-
logical lock-in effects. One promising option to reduce 
the water-intensity in the electricity sector could be the 
expansion of renewable energies like solar photovoltaic 
(19 cubic meters per terajoule) or wind (0.2 cubic meters 
per terajoule). The operation of solar PV and wind power 
plants is, by far, less water-intensive compared to ther-
mal power generation based on fossil fuels (the average 
water con-sumption thermal electricity generation with 
oil is 485 cubic meters per terajoule; with gas, 267 cubic 
meters per terajoule) (Mekonnen et al. 2015). Moreover, 
for solar and water energy sources, water consumption 
for the fuel supply is nonexistent. In any case, water-
related risks and impacts to the power sector ought to 
be placed high on the country’s power sector moderni-
zation and capacity expansion agenda.
3.2 The Challenging Water Situation in Iran
With a water crisis looming, the power sector is well-
advised to become less reliant on water. Water stress 
levels in Iran are anticipated to increase significantly in 
the coming decades (Luck et al. 2015). While Iran has a 
more advanced water management system than most 
countries in the region, and a long tradition of innova-
tive water management reaching back to the ancient 
Persians, water shortage has become a serious issue for 
the country (Madani 2014). The reasons for the inten-
sifying water challenges in Iran are manifold; though 
some are periodic, or repairable (like summer droughts, 
or damaged pipes), other drivers are structural and long-
term. On the one hand, rapid population growth and 
socio-economic development have fuelled water de-
mand in the last decades. On the other, inefficiency and 
mismanagement (particularly in the agricultural sector) 
have contributed to current water difficulties.
The agricultural sector in Iran relies heavily on irrigation, 
and consumes over 90 percent of the country’s limited 
water resources (Madani 2014). Inefficient water use in 













Electricity generation: 289.2 TWh
Source: Jorli et al. 2017 based on Tavenir 2017
Figure 3. Shares of electricity generation in Iran by source 2016
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and energy, which were granted to achieve the nation’s 
goal of food self-sufficiency – a high priority on the Ira-
nian political agenda for decades (ibid.). International 
sanctions have also played a role, preventing the neces-
sary investment in essential infrastructures, in both the 
water and agricultural sectors (Beevor 2018).
These structural weaknesses are aggravated by ecologi-
cal factors. The country has been experiencing severe 
droughts for several years. In the future, this trend is 
expected to continue, due to climate change. Annual 
precipitation is expected to decrease, and temperatures 
to increase, making the already mostly arid and semi-
arid country even drier and warmer (Amiri and Eslamian 
2010). As a result, the level of water stress in most areas 
of the country will increase to a very high level (Luck et 
al. 2015).
Today, lakes and rivers are drying, and groundwater re-
sources are declining. Iran currently uses more than 80 
percent of its renewable freshwater resources, although 
international standards recommend the use of no more 
than 40 percent, to ensure environmental sustainability 
(Fanack 2017). In the last 50 years, water availability per 
capita has drastically decreased, from over 4,800 cubic 
meters in 1970, to about 1,640 cubic meters in 2014 
(FAO, 2016b). And yet, at an average of 250 liters per day 
per capita, water consumption remains twice as high as 
the world average (Madani 2014). If the country’s current 
and future water demands are to be met, far-reaching 
measures will have to be taken, including the reduction 
of water use inefficiencies in the agricultural sector, the 
reduction of household water consumption and a com-
mitment to the protection of both surface and ground-
water sources. In addition, desalination of seawater and 
re-use of waste water are being considered as emerging 
solutions to the country’s growing water demand gap.
3.3 Growing Energy Requirements for 
Water Desalination in Iran
Seawater desalination is a promising future strategy to 
overcome water gaps, as the method has the capacity 
to make seawater suitable for potable use at large scale. 
However, seawater desalination is a very energy-inten-
sive process, and its large-scale application will result in 
increased energy demand. Today, only about 1 percent 
of global water demand is met by desalination, and yet, it 
already accounts for roughly one quarter of the total en-
ergy consumption in the water sector (OECD/IEA 2016). 
By 2040, desalination capacities worldwide are project-
ed to quadruple, and will account for 60 percent of the 
water sector’s energy consumption (ibid.). Particularly in 
the Middle East, desalination capacities are expected to 
increase significantly, accounting for over 10 percent of 
final energy consumption in the region by 2040 (ibid.).
Today, about 73 desalination plants are operating in Iran, 
with a capacity to treat 420,000 cubic meters of saline 
water per day, or 148 million cubic meters per year (Fi-
nancial Tribune 2018). Though in 2004, the desalination 
plant size in Iran ranged between 100 and 10,000 cu-
bic meters per day (Madaeni and Ghanei 2004), plant 
sizes have since evolved. This year, the construction of a 
desalination complex with a total capacity of 1,000,000 
cubic meters per day began in Bandar Abbas (DesalData 
2018). To meet the electricity demand of these desalina-
tion facilities, a power plant with a 300-400 megawatt 
capacity will be built.
In keeping with its current increase in desalination ca-
pacity, Iran is ranked second among all MENA countries 
in terms of future planned installation of additional de-
salination capacities. By 2040, Iran’s water desalination 
capacity is expected to increase to over 10 billion cubic 
meters. This will require more than 40 terawatt hours of 
electricity. (Fig. 4)
Today, desalination in Iran is predominantly powered by 
fossil fuels; planned capacity expansions likewise focus 
on conventional fossil fuel power plants as sources of 
electricity. However, studies have shown that desalina-
tion plants in Iran could also be cost-effectively powered 
by renewable energy systems, which could significantly 
increase the sustainability of the country’s desalination 
efforts (Caldera et al. 2016).
4. Identification of Water-Related  
Risks and Potential Impacts on the  
Iranian Power Sector
This chapter presents and discusses water-related risks to 
and potential impacts on the Iranian power sector. In a 
first step, water-related risks to the Iranian power sector 
were debated by experts from research institutions and 
ministries at an interdisciplinary workshop in Tehran, in 
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September 2018. There, experts evaluated the identified 
risks with regard to the level of risk they posed for the 
Iranian power sector, and the timeframe in which those 
risks are expected to occur. In a second step, potential 
impacts stemming from the identified water-related 
risks were discussed individually with Iranian stakehold-
ers, and evaluated according to their current and future 
relevance for the Iranian power system. Both the results 
of the evaluation of water-related risks and the assess-
ment of associated impacts on the Iranian power sector 
were subsequently analysed, to identify future research 
needs with respect to the Iranian water-energy nexus.
4.1 Water-Related Risks to the 
Iranian Power Sector
Most electricity generation technologies need water for 
cooling, steam turbines, cleaning processes and power 
plant operation. The amount of water required by differ-
ent types of electricity generation technologies varies. 
Today, the majority of power plants worldwide (includ-
ing thermal and hydropower) are water-intensive power 
plants. Limitations on water availability and quality can 
challenge the reliability of current electricity generation, 
as well as the feasibility and sustainability of future pow-
er sector extensions.
In Iran, electricity generation relies primarily on thermal 
power plants (at over 92 percent of electricity genera-
tion), including a higher share of older power plants with 
water-intensive wet-cooling technologies. In addition, 
Iran also generates electricity with a number of water-
reliant hydropower plants (5.7 percent of electricity gen-
eration) (Jorli et al. 2017). This water dependence makes 
the Iranian power sector vulnerable to water constraints 
such as drought, precipitation changes and competition 
over water resources with other sectors – such as the 
agricultural, industrial and residential sectors. The main 
risks for the power sector stemming from these con-
straints include decreasing water availability, seasonal 
variability of water availability, changes in water quality, 
changes in water temperature, sea level rise and regula-
tory uncertainty (Box 1).
A group of Iranian experts was consulted to better eval-
uate these water-related risks to the Iranian electricity 
sector. The experts were asked to assess the six water-
Source: OECD / IEA 2016.
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related risks (Box 1) in regard to the level of risk they 
pose to the Iranian power sector (low/medium/high), 
and the timeframe in which they expect that risk to oc-
cur. The results of this water-related risk assessment are 
presented in Figure 5. It should be noted that the fol-
lowing overview is just a snapshot of the participating 
experts’ opinions; though it provides initial insights, it 
should not be taken as representative statements.
The overall assessment of water-related risks to the Ira-
nian power sector reveals that all six predefined risks are 
either already relevant today, or anticipated to become 
relevant in the future. In the next two decades, the risk 
levels of decreased water availability, seasonal variability 
and changes in water quality are expected to be par-
ticularly high. Water temperature changes and sea level 
rise, on the other hand, are currently envisaged to be of 
only limited relevance to the electricity sector; by 2040, 
however, experts anticipate these risk levels to notice-
ably increase. The following summarizes the expert as-
sessments of the individual risks:
n   Decreasing water availability: All experts agree 
that decreased water availability is already a very sig-
nificant risk to power generation in Iran. All experts 
rated the risk of »decreasing water availability« as 
n  Decreasing water availability: Thermal and hy-
dropower plants have high water requirements, 
and are therefore vulnerable to decreasing water 
availability. Decreased water availability can nega-
tively affect power plants to varying degrees, re-
sulting in efficiency reductions, capacity cutbacks 
or even power plant shutdowns. Water availability 
is a growing concern with respect to meeting fu-
ture power generation needs.
n  Seasonal variability of water availability: In 
most regions, water availability varies throughout 
the year. This seasonal variability can result in pe-
riods in which water resources are insufficient to 
meet demand, as well as in other periods in which 
high volumes of water pose a risk to power gen-
eration. For example, rapid snowmelt in spring can 
overload reservoirs, or lead to floods, endanger-
ing power plants on riversides. This can result in 
springtime electricity losses, and inadequate water 
supply for electricity generation in summer. 
n  Changes in water quality: The quality of water 
can affect a power plant’s operation at both the 
water intake and water discharge sides. For ex-
ample, changes in water quality at the intake can 
lead to increased levels of scaling, corrosion and/or 
biological growth, which can reduce the efficiency 




the discharge water can adversely affect the eco-
system, if not adequately managed and regulated. 
In cases where the discharge water requirements 
cannot be met, the operation of the power plant 
may be compromised.
n  Changes in water temperature: An increase in 
water temperature can reduce cooling efficiency 
and increase the cooling water demand, negatively 
impacting power plant operation and electricity 
generation. Higher temperatures in the discharge 
water can make it difficult to meet river tempera-
ture regulations, which usually require discharge 
water temperatures to stay below a certain thresh-
old, to protect the ecosystem. 
n  Sea level rise: As a result of global warming, rising 
sea levels could impact coastal power generation 
infrastructures. Besides flooding, sea-level rise can 
also result in saltwater contamination of freshwater 
sources, while higher salinity may pose problems 
for power plant operation. 
n  Regulatory uncertainty: Regulatory restrictions 
may be imposed on water use for electricity genera-
tion. Areas of concern are uncertainty regarding fu-
ture regulatory changes – for example with respect 
to water prices, or water quality requirements – as 
well as potential conflicts resulting from water issues.
Sources: IRENA/WRI 2018; Rodriguez 2016; World Bank 2014; Gassert 2014; Chien et a. 2013; Feeley et al. 2008
Box 1: Water-Related Risks to the Power Sector
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Figure 5. Evaluation of water-related risks to the electricity sector in Iran today and in the future by 
Iranian experts 
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having medium to high relevance, today. In the next 5, 
10 and 20 years, experts expect the risks to the power 
sector stemming from decreased water availability to 
further increase.
n  Seasonal variability: Next to the overall decrease 
in water availability, the seasonal variability of water 
also poses risks to the energy sector. The majority of 
experts consulted consider this risk as already rele-
vant to the Iranian power sector, today. A number of 
experts classified the current risk level as already high, 
while others assessed the current risk to be of low or 
medium relevance, but likely to grow over time. By 
2040, the majority of experts rated the risk of »vary-
ing water availability« to potentially be high. 
n  Changes in water quality: The majority of experts 
surveyed think that changes in water quality are cur-
rently either irrelevant, or of only low relevance to the 
Iranian power sector. Only a small number of experts 
classified the risk stemming from changes in water 
quality to be high today; looking to the future, how-
ever, experts expect the risk to become increasingly 
relevant by 2040. From 2030 onwards, all experts 
supported the assumption that decreased water 
quality will pose a risk to power generation; by 2040, 
the majority of experts anticipate that risk to be high. 
n  Changes in water temperature: By comparison to 
the other water-related challenges, the Iranian ex-
perts rated the risk of changes in water temperature 
as either irrelevant, or of only low to medium rele-
vance for the power sector today. The future risk as-
sessment, however, clearly showed that rising water 
temperatures entail increasing risk levels for Iranian 
power generation. By 2040, all experts anticipated 
that rising water temperature would constitute a risk 
to the Iranian power sector; the majority classified 
that risk as medium to high. 
n  Sea level rise: Only a few experts estimated the risks 
associated with sea level rise to be relevant to the 
Iranian power sector today. However, by 2040, more 
experts envision rising sea levels to be a relevant risk 
to the power sector, and they anticipate the risk level 
to increase with time.
n  Regulatory uncertainty: Yet another potential wa-
ter-related risk to the power sector is regulatory un-
certainty, for example, with respect to the share and 
amount of water available to the power sector, or the 
future price of water. The experts’ discussion frequent-
ly addressed the topic of water distribution between 
sectors, especially the levels of water use in the agricul-
tural sector, which is much higher than water use for 
electricity generation. But, as the Iranian power sector 
remains predominantly state-controlled, the majority 
of experts expect the risks of regulatory uncertainty to 
be manageable. Nonetheless, the relevance of regula-
tory uncertainty with respect to water for the Iranian 
power sector is expected to increase over the next two 
decades.
In addition to these six, predefined, general water-re-
lated risks, the experts also identified further risks for 
the Iranian power sector, which may also affect the sec-
tor’s water withdrawal and consumption. One factor 
mentioned as a risk to the electricity sector’s water con-
sumption was the limited availability of modern power 
generation technology in Iran. Limited access to mod-
ern technologies is closely related to both the previous 
and current (November 2018) rounds of trade sanctions. 
Other risks highlighted by the expert discussion were the 
environmental risks stemming from discharge water, in 
terms of both thermal, and other varieties of pollution. 
In this context, the risks to water quality from primary 
fossil fuel production were also mentioned as relevant. 
Oil spills, as a cause of water pollution, could also affect 
the intake water quality for cooling in thermal power 
plants. Finally, one water-related risk that was highlight-
ed by several experts was the geopolitical risk to Iran’s 
water supply. With the sources of some relevant water 
bodies located in neighbouring countries, the supply of 
water can be strongly influenced by these nations’ water 
politics.
4.2 Potential Impacts of Water-Related Risk  
on the Iranian Energy Sector
In addition to their assessment of water-related risks, ex-
perts also discussed potential risk-related impacts on the 
Iranian power sector. On the supply side, water stress 
can impact current power generation in the form of 
either decreased electricity generation, or reduced effi-
ciency levels. Planning and development of future power 
infrastructures may also be affected by water issues. On 
the demand side, water-related risks to the power sec-
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tor might reach electricity consumers in the form of in-
creased electricity prices, or unreliability of supply. This 
could potentially have larger societal effects, for exam-
ple, in the form of public discontent, or even protests 
(Box 2). 
Water stress is already significantly impacting Iran’s elec-
tricity generation infrastructure, which is overly reliant 
on thermal and hydropower plants. Correspondingly, 
all experts agreed that decreased power generation 
and reduced cooling efficiency have already occurred. 
They likewise agreed that decreased power generation 
will surely continue to occur, while reduced cooling ef-
ficiency will likely remain an issue for the power sector. 
Decreased power generation is expected to have major 
consequences. Reduced cooling efficiency, on the other 
hand, is seen as less critical, and likely to result in only 
minor operational consequences for power plants. With 
regard to the geographic extent of such impacts, de-
creased power generation is expected to affect the na-
tional level, while reduced cooling efficiency is expected 
to occur mainly locally.
Decreased power generation and lower efficiency may 
result in financial losses for power generation compa-
nies. This potential impact was evaluated differently 
from expert to expert. One the one hand, it was ob-
served that financial losses were irrelevant, as the state 
owns most of the power infrastructure, and could there-
fore cover potential losses, provided Iran continues to 
receive oil export revenue. On the other hand, some 
experts saw these losses as problematic, if not for the 
generation companies, than for Iran as a country. They 
expected financial losses to be most likely, and to have 
potentially major consequences on the national level.
In regard to the effects of water stress on the planning 
and development of new power sector infrastructures, 
experts observed that impacts have already occurred, or 
will occur in the near future, but that permits to locate 
power plants were not likely to be denied, nor energy 
infrastructure investments suspended. Instead, they ex-
pected planning and investment to shift (as it already 
is) to other locations, for example, to areas in southern 
Iran with lower water stress levels. This impact was es-
timated as of potentially great consequence, mainly on 
the district and provincial levels, but not on a national 
scale.
Regarding impacts on energy consumers, water short-
age has already affected Iranian electricity supply. This 
spring, the country’s energy minister, Reza Ardakanian, 
warned that summer power outages were inevitable 
across Iran, if electricity consumption was not decreased 
(Radio Farda, April 9, 2018). Likewise, the Iranian experts 
agreed that unreliable electricity supply has al-ready re-
sulted from water scarcity in Iran. The probability that 
this impact will continue to occur was rated to be most 
likely, while the severity of the impact was estimated to 
be moderate to major. The impact is expected to affect 
the local level up to the national level.
The potential for higher electricity prices due to water-
related risks was evaluated differently from expert to ex-
n  Power Generation
 –  Decreased power generation, or e 
ven power plant shutdowns (e. g., due  
to limited availability of cooling water  
during heat waves)
 –  Reduced cooling efficiency due to  
higher water temperatures 
 –  Financial losses for power generation  
companies
n Electricity consumers
 –  Reduced reliability of power supply,  
elec tricity shortages or even blackouts
 –  Higher electricity prices (due, e. g., to  
the possibility of economic pricing of  
water, leading to higher energy produc - 
tion costs, or reliance on more expen - 
sive forms of generation)
 n New electricity infrastructure
 – Permits to locate power plants denied
 – Energy infrastructure investments suspended
n Society
 –  Social and political discontent (e. g., conflicts 
with local communities over access to water) 
Sources: World Bank 2014; PWC 2011
Box 2: Potential Impacts of Water-Related 
Risks to the Power Sector
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pert. While some saw the probability of this impact as 
unlikely, because electricity prices are stipulated by the 
government, others were certain that an increase would 
occur in the future. The experts agreed, however, that 
if it did occur, it would have at least minor to moderate 
consequences on the national level.
In terms of its effects on society, access to water and 
water allocation can be sources of tension, either within 
or between states (OECD 2005). In Iran, water shortages 
have already resulted in dissatisfaction, and minor pro-
tests, as was the case in the southwestern provinces, in 
mid-2018. Electricity shortage can likewise be a source 
of tension. Accordingly, the experts anticipated that this 
impact has already occurred, and will most likely contin-
ue to occur, with the potential for major consequences, 
mainly on the district and provincial levels, but also on 
the national level.
This impact assessment shows that all impacts were 
evaluated as either having already occurred, or as likely 
to occur in the near future. Overall, the severity of the 
impacts was estimated to be moderate to major, but 
in most cases, not yet critical. In terms of the impacts’ 
geographic scope, the picture is mixed; some impacts 
(like reduced cooling efficiency, or effects on the devel-
opment of new power infrastructures) are expected to 
occur mainly locally, while others (like decreased power 
generation, or higher electricity prices) are expected to 
have effects on all scales, up to the national level.
Beyond these predefined impacts, the experts discussed 
further potential water-induced impacts on the power 
sector. One potentially positive impact highlighted was 
the prospect that renewable energy technologies, like 
wind and photovoltaic, might be more seriously consid-
ered, as such technologies use only very little water. An-
other physical impact which was raised – although po-
tentially relevant only at the local level – was that water 
extraction from groundwater wells may destabilize the 
ground on which the power infrastructures are located. 
And, while the Minister of Energy, Reza Ardakanian, is-
sued assurances that Iran’s water and power industries 
will not be directly affected by the re-imposed US sanc-
tions (Mehrnews, June 1, 2018), limited access to tech-
nology – including renewable energy and water-saving 
technologies – was seen as posing a potential challenge 
to the electricity sector’s efforts to meet the country’s 
rapidly growing electricity demand.
5. Discussion and Outlook
The share of water consumed by the Iranian power sec-
tor is low by comparison to the amount of water used 
in the energy sector as a whole, and even lower com-
pared to the country’s overall water consumption. Yet, 
even the power sector – which is growing quickly – con-
tributes to, and is affected by, water stress. Our discus-
sions with Iranian experts highlight the extent to which 
the power sector is already, currently, being affected 
by water-related risks. According to those experts, the 
majority of impacts – such as declining power genera-
tion, shifting locations of new electricity infrastructures 
or public discontent over energy and water issues – 
have already occurred, and are expected to gain rel-
evance in coming years. In light of these findings, and 
of the political relevance of both water and energy se-
curity, one may conclude that, in Iran, the concept of 
the water-energy nexus is well understood. However, 
thus far, applications of and research on the concept 
remain limited, both in the energy sector, generally, 
and the power sector, in particular. And while both the 
energy and water sectors are coordinated by the same 
ministry, the Ministry of Energy and Water, the two 
sectors are, to a large extent, governed and regulated 
separately. Choices and decisions concerning electricity 
infrastructures made today will have decades-long ef-
fects on the level of water consumed by the power sec-
tor. At the same time, the level of water stress in Iran 
is expected to increase, potentially adversely affecting 
both electricity supply and water security. To avoid 
technology lock-in effects, and unfavourable impacts 
on the Iranian population and economy, the complexi-
ties of the water-energy nexus need to be explored in 
more detail. Based on the analysis, and the results of 
the expert evaluation of water-related risks and associ-
ated impacts on the Iranian power sector, the following 
research needs for the Iranian water-energy nexus can 
be identified:
n  Water availability and electricity production are 
strongly site-specific, making geographical context 
a critical factor in risk and impact assessment. The 
water-energy nexus must, therefore, be assessed 
not only on a national level, but on a sub-national 
scale as well, to identify the areas in which water use 
for electricity generation will be most critical. Ques-
tions to be addressed include: What percentage of 
power plants are located in water-stressed locations? 
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What other water demands exist in the same loca-
tions? What are the drivers of local water demand? 
Is regional demand expected to increase? Is water 
availability expected to decrease, based on differ-
ent climate scenarios, and how will this affect power 
generation? How does power plant water withdrawal 
and discharge affect local communities and the envi-
ronment?
n	 Renewable energies (especially less water-intensive 
wind and solar photo-voltaic technologies) must be 
considered, specifically, in their capacity to reduce 
water demand, and therewith the water-related risks 
and impacts on the power sector. Expert discussions 
highlighted the fact that although solar and wind 
energy are regarded as beneficial, their advantages 
with respect to water have not yet been considered. 
Therefore, potential water savings compared to con-
ventional power infrastructure developments should 
be quantified for different energy scenarios. To com-
pare fossil-fuel and renewable power technologies, 
new holistic decision-making instruments are need-
ed, which integrate economic, socio-economic, envi-
ronmental and social aspects in the decision-making 
process (multi-criteria approaches).
n  In regard to the expansion of renewable energy gen-
eration, the consequences of the US sanctions against 
the Iranian economy should also be considered. 
With the exception of smaller-scale wind turbines, 
Iran depends on technology imports for renewable 
energy technology. Experts regarded this as a ma-
jor barrier for the wider deployment of renewables 
in Iran.
n  To better evaluate the consequences of water use in 
the energy sector, the external costs of water use in 
Iran should be analysed. According to the experts, 
thus far, only the negative consequences of emissions 
are regarded as environmental costs.
n  Planned and future implementations of improved 
power plant cooling technologies should be ana-
lysed, in combination and comparison with renew-
able energy technologies, and with a focus on costs 
and environmental impacts. Some of the experts 
stressed that although improved power plant cooling 
suffices as an interim solution, it is not a sustainable 
pathway for the long-term future.
n  Although water is already part of a criteria set for the 
planning of new power plant locations in Iran, future 
climate-induced changes in both water availability and 
quality, as well as competing uses (especially in the 
agricultural sector) have yet to be sufficiently consid-
ered. Given the rapidly increasing electricity demand 
in Iran, the expected expansion and modernization of 
the electricity infrastructure must take future water 
demand into consideration. To harmonize the devel-
opment of energy and non-energy water demands, 
it would be necessary to analyse institutional set-
ups and decision-making procedures, and to enable 
a dialogue between the different sectors (including 
the agricultural sector) aimed at integrating planning, 
and ensuring sustainable development. To enable a 
meaningful dialogue, political priorities, norms, per-
ceptions and underlying normative assumptions must 
be reflected. This imperative was highlighted in an ex-
ample given by one of the experts, who stated that, 
because electricity supply security takes top-priority 
for consumers, many in the sector (worried that mod-
ifications could negatively affect that supply security) 
are critical of, or even resistant to change.
n  Self-reinforcing dynamics between future electricity 
demand in the production of unconventional water 
(desalination and waste-water reuse), and the associ-
ated water demand for power generation, need to 
be studied further, so that they can be taken into ac-
count in electricity and water infrastructure planning.
n  Beyond the electricity sector, the much higher levels 
of water withdrawal and consumption in the produc-
tion of primary energy carriers must be considered 
and quantified. 
n  Synthetic fuels offer an innovative means of trans-
forming current fossil fuel-based industries into sus-
tainable business models, as well as the opportunity 
to strengthen collaboration with Europe, and to open 
new export markets (as a countermeasure to the US’ 
withdrawal from the JCPOA, and as a joint EU-Iran 
Collaboration Program). The effects of such develop-
ments on water demand in the energy sector would 
need to be assessed and quantified. 
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